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Problem Description

The A5/1 cipher used in GSM has been under attack, analysis and critique for a long
time because of deficiencies, well documented in many papers. However, few
findings have evolved into practical attacks. People declaring A5/1 as broken have
never released the tools necessary to perform decryption of GSM traffic, nor have
they published proof that confirms their claims. The media in particular should also
take some part of the blame, as they do not always get the facts right and create
inaccurate or misleading impressions as to whether A5/1 is cracked or not.

The aim is to generate rainbow tables as a pre-computation stage to enable a cipher
text-only attack against the A5/1 encryption algorithm. Using the A5/1 Security
Project as a basis, this project will attempt to create a set of rainbow tables and
investigate the feasibility of capturing GSM traffic. We will try to perform an active
attack where a GSM network is created.
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Abstract
We have participated in the creation of almost two terabytes of tables aimed at
cracking A5/1, the most common ciphering algorithm used in GSM. Given 114-bit
of known plaintext, we are able to recover the session key with a hit rate of 19%.
The tables are expected to be unique as they provide the best coverage yet known to
the authors and research workers and they are the first step in a real-world passive
attack against GSM.

An initial investigation and analysis into the air interface of GSM were performed,
from both a theoretical and practical point of view. These examinations would be
essential in order to utilize the downloaded tables in a practical attack.

Additionally, a rogue GSM network was built and deployed without enabling
ciphering and frequency hopping. This active attack was purely based on opensource software and hardware, implying that real GSM networks could be spoofed
with resources available to the general public
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Introduction
1.1 Background
Security is a significant issue, particularly in the present mechanically propelled
society. GSM is an overall standard for computerized remote cell phones, at present
utilized by billions of people. These individuals utilize their telephones to store,
transmit and get voice and information correspondences. In contrast to a fixed phone,
which offers some degree of physical security, a remote connection empowers
anybody with a recipient to latently capture the traffic. Along these lines, it is
profoundly significant that safety efforts are taken to guarantee the privacy of clients'
telephone calls and SMS messages. In spite of the huge fame, the security parts of
GSM has not gotten the investigation it merits. Hypothetical shortcomings have been
known for a considerable length of time, with research running from the generally
unreliable encryption calculations to the absence of system validation. All things
considered, next to no exertion has been placed into down to earth research to affirm
the usage we every day depend on. Dissecting and catching GSM traffic was up to
this point an unexplored zone. The fundamental reasons being the mind boggling
flagging instruments included, the costly equipment necessities and absence of
capture programming. Be that as it may, things might be going to change with the
development of open-source instruments, for example, the USRP, GNU Radio,
AirProbe and OpenBTS. These instruments empowers anybody with enthusiasm for
GSM security to examine the hypothetical security standards through down to earth
approach.
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1.2 Limitations
There are a few approaches against GSM; on the ciphering algorithm itself and on
the framework all in all with its appended gear. However, this thesis will only
highlight two attack situations:
1. The passive attack utilizing rainbow tables to crack the ciphering algorithm
and the USRP together with software for passive interception of traffic.
2. a. The active attack using the way that verification of the system isn't
performed. Concerning design of GSM, the fundamental objective (of this
postulation) is the air interface between the Mobile Station (MS) and the Base
Transceiver Station (BTS). The system side of GSM won't be explore in depth.

1.3 Ethical Point of View
During a moral talk, we chose that working inside the lawful system had the most
elevated need. There was agreement on the way that splitting someone else's GSM
traffic ought not be performed. Here are a portion of the lawful suggestions in some
of the countries:
GSM security research is permitted in City college of New York.
• Receiving GSM traffic is (in fact) permitted.
• Decoding (for example breaking) your very own GSM traffic is permitted.
• Decoding another person's GSM traffic is illegal.(we performed for the
project point of view).
Unlawful utilization of recurrence range may prompt detainment up to three (3)
years or on the other hand fine up to ten (10) million or both. [2]
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GSM
This section gives an outline of the essential capacities and primary elements in the
GSM arrange. The convention stack is first analyzed and examined, before the
relationship between the substances and their addresses is characterized. Physical
and intelligent channels are in this manner clarified and delineated over a
progression of areas. Furthermore, channel coding, interleaving and recurrence
bouncing are disclosed to give an comprehension of the numerous intricate
techniques associated with GSM. At long last, this part plots some portability the
executives methods, for example, verification, call and SMS arrangement. On the
off chance that this is your first prologue to GSM, an expression of caution may be
all together at this point.
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) gives a different
archive comprising of 10 pages for every one of the abbreviations utilized in the
GSM details [3]. This theory will tragically not be vastly improved. A full rundown
of abbreviations is given toward the finish of the report.

2.1 Background
GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) is an advanced cell innovation
utilized for transmitting voice and information administrations. GSM enables clients
to wander flawlessly starting with one system then onto the next, while additionally
giving individual portability. In expansion, both discourse and flagging channels are
digitalized, which basically marked GSM as the second-age (2G) versatile
framework. Since its first dispatch in 1991, GSM quickly turned into the most well
known cell phone framework on the planet. In February 2017, an expected 4.77
billion endorsers crosswise over more than 219 nations were utilizing GSM or
3GSM [4].
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2.2 Architecture
The design of GSM with its elements and interfaces is appeared in figure 2.1. A
single GSM arrange built up and worked by a specialist co-op is alluded to as a
Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN). In the accompanying area, the key
substances in a PLMN are quickly portrayed.

Mobile Station (MS)
The MS is utilized by the supporter as a specialized gadget in the GSM organize.
The term MS incorporate the physical telephone itself, called the Mobile Equipment
(ME), furthermore, the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). The SIM guarantees
secure access to a specific organize as it contains calculations utilized for
confirmation (A3) and for creating an encryption key (A8). It likewise contains
supporter related data, for example, the client name or, all the more precisely, the
International Mobile Subscriber Personality (IMSI), the mystery confirmation key
Ki, and arrangements of liked and
Illegal PLMNs.

Figure 2.1: Architecture of GSM.
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Base Station Subsystem (BSS)
The BSS controls all the radio related errands and gives availability between the
system and the MS by means of the air interface. The BSS is made out of two
sections, the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) and the Base Station Controller (BSC).
The BTS goes about as the correspondence point for the MS. It transmits and gets
sign to and from the MS, while additionally taking care of multiplexing, control,
regulation, discourse encoding/deciphering and figuring of these sign. The interface
between the MS and BTS is known as the Um interface (or all the more exactly the
air interface). The BSC gives the insight in a BSS. It controls a lot of BTSs and
oversees handover choices, radio channels, paging coordination and other required
control capacities. It speaks with the BTSs over what is named the Abis interface.

Network Switching Subsystem (NSS)
The NSS controls various BSSs and its primary job is to set up the correspondences
between two clients. It likewise incorporates databases required for extra endorser
and versatility the executives. The different parts of the NSS are portrayed in the rest
of this segment.

Mobile Switching Center (MSC)
The MSC is the center part of any NSS. This segment controls a few BSCs and is
answerable for directing of approaching and active calls. It likewise gives the
administration capacities to terminal versatility, for example, enlistment,
confirmation, area data and handover.

Transcoder and Rate Adaptation Unit (TRAU)
The TRAU is answerable for compacting voice correspondence at the air interface.
It is put between both the BTS and BSC or between the BSC and MSC.
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Home Location Register (HLR)
The HLR is a database putting away the endorser explicit parameters. Data in the
HLR comprises of the phone number apportioned to the endorser, their present area,
Ki, permitted administrations and the IMSI.

Visitor Location Register (VLR)
The VLR is a database intended to restrain the measure of request made to the HLR.
At the point when an endorser wanders away from his own system, data is sent from
the supporter's HLR to the VLR of the serving system. A VLR can either be
apportioned to a few MSCs, or co-situated with a solitary MSC.

Gateway Mobile Switching Center (GMSC)
The GMSC is a trade between the PSTN and GSM organize that perceives cell phone
numbers and is outfitted with the ability to get to the HLR for directing help. This
substance is required as the fixed system can't associate an approaching call to the
nearby target MSC (because of its powerlessness to cross examine the HLR).

Short Message Service Gateway (SMS-G)
The SMS-G (not appeared in figure 2.1) is the term used to on the whole depict the
two passages for taking care of SMS messages headed in various ways. The SMSGMSC gives an incidentally 'store and forward' instrument for approaching SMS
messages. On the off chance that the beneficiary isn't accessible, it lines the SMS for
later retry. The SMS-IWMSC (Short Message Service Inter-Working Mobile
Switching Center) is utilized for active SMS messages.
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Authentication Center (AuC)
The AuC holds a protected database putting away recognizable proof and validation
data identified with every endorser. The traits in this database incorporate the
supporter's IMSI, Ki and Location Area Identity (LAI). The AuC is liable for
creating confirmation triplets of qualities comprising of an irregular number
(RAND), a marked reaction (SRES), and session key Kc.

Equipment Identity Register (EIR)
The EIR is a database putting away three records: the white, dark, and the dim
rundown. The white rundown contains all hardware personalities that are allowed
for correspondence. The boycott contains all hardware personalities that are denied.
MEs showing up in the dark rundown are not really denied, yet are followed for
explicit purposes.

2.3 Protocol Stack
This segment offers a short prologue to the convention stack in GSM as appeared in
figure 2.2. The convention stack comprises of three layers: the physical (layer 1),
the information connect (layer 2), and the system (layer 3). This segment just takes
a gander at the bits sent or got by the MS. A further investigate the convention stack
from the system side won't be investigated.

Figure 2.2: Protocol Stack of GSM [5]
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Physical layer (layer 1)
All strategies and components used to cause correspondence conceivable reporting
in real time interface to speak to the physical layer systems [6]. These methodology
comprise of synchronization, control, coding, and different capacities that control
the foundation and support of the radio channel.
The physical layer is a mix of recurrence division different access (FDMA) and timedivision various access (TDMA) to enable clients to get to the radio assets in a cell.
With FDMA, the recurrence band is partitioned into transporters or channels, each
200 kHz wide. Each channel is partitioned into eight separate timeslots (marked T0
to T7). This division of frequencies in the time space is alluded to as TDMA. These
eight timeslots together is known as a TDMA outline. A supporter is permitted to
use one timeslot each edge. The length of an edge is 4.615 ms, in this manner one
single timeslot endures just 0.5769 ms.
There are thirteen diverse recurrence groups characterized in GSM [7]. Be that as it
may, the 850 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, and 1900 MHz groups are the most
ordinarily utilized. The recurrence groups utilized inside every one of the four
territories are likewise composed. They contrast basically just in the frequencies,
with the end goal that different cooperative energy impacts can be exploited;
consequently we just give a few subtleties for the use in the 900 MHz band.
In the 900 MHz band, a sum of 70 MHz data transfer capacity is assigned, two 25MHz recurrence groups for up-and downlink and a 20 MHz unused watchman band
between them. The MS transmits in the 890-to 915-MHz run (uplink) and the BTS
transmits in the 935-to 960-MHz (downlink) band. This relates to 124 duplex
channels, where each channel inside a BTS is alluded to as an Absolute Radio
Frequency Channel Number (ARFCN). This number depicts a couple of frequencies,
one uplink and one downlink, and is given a channel file somewhere in the range of
C0 and C123, with C0 assigned as the reference point channel. An ARFCN could be
utilized to figure the definite recurrence (in MHz) of the radio channel. In the GSM
900 band, this is figured by the accompanying conditions:
Fuplink(n) = 890 + 0.2n,

1 < n < 124
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Fdownlink(n) = Fuplink(n) + 45,

1 < n < 124

Similar formulas are also defined for the other GSM frequency bands.

Data link layer (layer 2)
The information connect layer is answerable for the right and complete exchange of
edges between the system layer substances over the air interface. The flagging
convention utilized in this layer, LAPDm, is an altered variant of the LAPD (Link
Access Procedures on the D-channel) which is especially adjusted to the TDMA
burst structure of GSM. The term 'DM channel' is alluded to an assortment of all the
different flagging diverts required in GSM..
LAPDm actualizes the accompanying essential capacities [8]:
• The association of layer 3 (arrange layer) data into outlines.
• The foundation, the support, and the end of at least one information connects on the Dm
channel.
• Sequence control so as to keep up the successive request of casings crosswise over
information interface associations.
• Detection of organization and operational mistakes on an information interface.
• Flow control.
• The recognized transmission and gathering of numbered data (I) outlines.
• The unacknowledged transmission and gathering of unnumbered data (UI) outlines.
Error detection and correction schemes are given by a mix of square and
convolutional coding utilized in mix with interleaving at the physical layer. This is
clarified in more detail in segment 2.9 and 2.10. The all out length of a LAPDm
outline is constantly 184 bits (23 octets), with division for bigger messages.
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Reference section H will look further into the changed kinds of LAPDm outlines..

Network layer (layer 3)
The system layer contains every one of the capacities important to set up, keep up,
and end portable associations [9] [10]. The system layer likewise gives the control
capacities to help extra administrations, for example, the short message
administrations (SMS). The three sub layers in layer 3 offer administrations as
pursues: :
• Radio Resource Management (RR): The RR sublayer is answerable for design of
the physical and legitimate channels at the air interface. This incorporates the
executives of frequencies, timeslots, channel design, control, synchronization, and
recurrence jumping codes. Another significant RR technique is the enactment of
figuring
• Mobility Management (MM): The MM sublayer oversees endorsers and tracks
their developments. These strategies are solely performed in collaboration between
the MS and MSC. This include:
– Location update: putting away and following of the endorser's area.
– Mobile verification: a test reaction instrument.
– IMSI connect: the area update strategy (e.g., when the MS is controlled on).
– IMSI disengage: tells the system that the MS is never again in administration
(e.g., when the MS is controlled off).
– TMSI reallocation: guarantees the classification of an endorser's IMSI.
• Connection Management (CM): partitioned further into three sublayers:
– Call Control (CC): foundation, support and arrival of calls.
– Short Message Service (SMS): the executives of SMS messages.
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– Supplementary Services (SS): treatment of every one of extra administrations that
are not associated with the center usefulness of GSM.

2.4 Addressing
GSM determine both client and gear tending to. Other than these identifiers, a few
different codes utilized for portraying area zones have been characterized; they are
required for the versatility the executives and for tending to arrange components.
The most significant kinds of addresses and identifiers are introduced in this area.

International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
The IMSI is a number (up to 15 digits) that interestingly distinguishes an endorser
inside the worldwide GSM organize. As appeared in figure 2.3, the IMSI comprises
of the Mobile Country Code (MCC), Mobile Network Code (MNC) and the Mobile
Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN). MSIN remarkably distinguishes a client
inside the home GSM organize. The MCC and MNC joined are utilized to
exceptionally distinguish a GSM PLMN in a nation ((e.g., 410 as MCC for US; and
MNC 01, 06 and 03 for the systems of T Mobile, Lyca and Simple Mobile,
separately). [11]

Figure 2.3: Structure of the IMSI
The IMSI is utilized by the system for recognizing a (wandering) supporter, just as
charging, charging and bookkeeping. This distinguishing proof is put away in the
SIM, AuC, and HLR or privately duplicated to mindful VLR.
At whatever point a MS is turned on, it might need to play out an IMSI join system,
which brings about the transmission of the IMSI in clear content. This is
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fundamental so as to discover the membership information. At the point when
enlisted, the MS is doled out an impermanent distinguishing proof called the
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) inside the region. This is a 32-piece
code utilized in consequent area updates, paging and call endeavors as a security
intend to make it progressively hard to follow and recognize a specific client. The
mapping among IMSI and TMSI is kept by the VLR.

Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number (MSISDN)
The MSISDN particularly distinguishes a membership in GSM and is normally the
phone number that an individual would dial so as to arrive at another endorser. The
MSISDN structure is appeared in figure
2.4. It is made out of up to 15 digits; the Country Code (CC), the National
Destination Code (NDC) and the Subscriber Number (SN). The CC recognizes a
nation or a geographic region the MS is enrolled to, though the NDC distinguishes
the PLMN inside a nation. SN is the number appointed to the supporter by the
specialist co-op. An endorser is relegated another MSISDN for each related GSM
administration (one for voice, another for fax and so forth).

Figure 2.4: Structure of the MSISDN
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Mobile Subscriber Roaming Number (MSRN)
The MSRN is a transitory, area subordinate ISDN number with a similar structure
as the MSISDN. Figure 2.5 affirms the indistinguishable structure. The MSRN is
doled out to the MS by the neighborhood dependable VLR and used to course calls
to the focused on MSC.

Figure 2.5: Structure of the MSRN

International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)
Each ME has a universally interesting identifier, called the IMEI. This number can
be utilized to deny unlicensed gear access to the system or track taken hardware. The
IMEI is made out of a Type Allocation Code (TAC), a Serial Number (SNR) and a
Spare (SP). The TAC extraordinarily recognizes the model of the ME, the SNR
characterizes the ME's sequential number and the SP is a Luhn Check Digit1. A
more current type of IMEI, named IMEI Software Version (IMEISV) excludes the
SP and rather includes a Software Version Number (SVN) toward the end. The SVN
recognizes which programming adaptation the ME is running. The creation of both
the IMEI and IMESI is appeared in figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6: Structure of the IMEI and IMEISV

Location Area Identifier (LAI)
Each GSM network is subdivided into location areas identified by a unique LAI
within the network. This number consists of the MCC, MNC and a Location Area
Code (LAC) as seen in figure 2.7. The LAC is a number of maximum of five digits
which identifies a location area within a PLMN. This is used as a unique reference
for the current location of a subscriber. The location area is further divided into cells,
each being uniquely identified by a Cell Identifier (CI).

Figure 2.7: Structure of the LAI
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Base Station Identity Code (BSIC)
The BSIC is a number that distinguishes a BTS. The code is 6 bits long; a 3 piece
Network Color Code (NCC) that recognizes the system and a 3 piece Base Station
Color Code (BCC) that distinguishes the BTS inside a specific region. The BSIC is
utilized by the MS to recognize BTSs broadcasting on a similar recurrence. A similar
code is then sent back to the system by the MS in the entirety of its estimation
reports. This enables the system to affirm that the MS is tuned to the right
frequencies.

2.5 Logical channels
In the GSM wording, a differentiation is made among physical and sensible
channels. Physical directs can be depicted regarding the recurrence and time space.
They are the genuine frequencies and the timeslots the MS or BTS are transmitting
or getting on. The consistent channels are mapped onto these physical channels. At
a specific moment a recurrence/timeslot might be either a traffic channel or some
control channels. At the end of the day, a coherent channel portrays the activity and
capacity of a physical channel at a given point in time [42].
There are two kinds of intelligent channels that are required to compose GSM:
Common Channels (CCH) and Dedicated Channels (DCH). As the figure 2.8
outlines, the CCH comprise of Broadcasting Channels\ (BCH) and Common Control
Channels (CCCH), though the DCH is separated into Dedicated Control Channels
(DCCH) and Traffic Channels (TCH).
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Figure 2.8: Logical channels in GSM

Broadcasting Channels (BCH)
The BCH are characterized for downlink just and are utilized by the BSS to convey
a similar data to all MSs in a cell. They incorporate the accompanying three subtypes
of channels:
• Frequency Correction Channel (FCCH): utilized for broadcasting recurrence
synchronization flag that empowers the MS to synchronize its bearer recurrence and
bit timing with the BTS. The MS will consistently check its known signal
frequencies to discover this channel. Having distinguished the specific sign, it
realizes that the following timeslot of a similar channel contains the synchronization
channel (SCH).
• Synchronization Channel (SCH): communicates outline synchronization signals
containing the TDMA outline number (FN) and the BSIC. This enables the MS to
synchronize in time with the BTS, and to distinguish the cell.
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• Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH): used to educate the MS about explicit
framework parameters, for example, area territory and system codes, the recurrence
bouncing succession, encompassing cell data, specific data about the channel design,
and greatest power level. This direct is constantly sent in a rehashing cycle on a
similar recurrence.

Common Control Channels (CCCH)
The CCCH are for the most part utilized for conveying flagging data important for
getting to the executive capacities (e.g., designation of DCH or radio asset on a
traffic channel). They are isolated into three channels:
Paging Channel (PCH): a downlink channel used to look or 'page' the MS to advise
that there is approaching traffic. The MS could be tended to by its allotted TMSI or
IMSI. Be that as it may, the GSM particulars doesn't permit paging by IMEI [13].
• The Random Access Channel (RACH): the uplink partner to the PCH, normally
utilized when the MS starts a solicitation to the system, (for example to make a call
or send a SMS message). It is gotten to by the MS in an aggressive various access
mode utilizing the guideline of opened Aloha [5]
• Access Grant Channel (AGCH): used to set up an association once a MS has been
paged on the PCH or started a solicitation on the RACH. It effectively invites the
MS to another control channel, for the most part the SDCCH, where the genuine
flagging set up is performed.
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Dedicated Control Channels (DCCH)
The DCCH are utilized for control, timing advance and other call related data, just
as different kinds of traffic channels. They are made up by the accompanying sorts
of channels:
• Standalone Dedicated Control Channel (SDCCH): a two-way flagging channel
utilized for trade of messages related with call foundation, confirmation, area
refreshing, SMS and other administration capacities.
• Slow Associated Control Channel (SACCH): consistently connected with either a
SDCCH or a traffic channel, and used to advise the MS about the frequencies
regarding neighboring cells, time arrangement and power control on the downlink.
For the uplink it is utilized for transmitting field quality estimations as information
parameters to a potential handover choice. It can transmit SMS messages whenever
related with a traffic channel. This is the reason SMS messages can be gotten while
being occupied in a call.
• Fast Associated Control Channel (FACCH): consistently connected with a traffic
channel and used to transmit pressing flagging messages. Its utilization goes to the
detriment of discourse information, as it "takes" timeslots from its related traffic
channel when the SACCH can't work rapidly enough. The FACCH is alluded to as
"quick" since it can convey up to fifty flagging messages for each second against
four every second for SDCCH [14].

Traffic Channels (TCH)
TCH are utilized for transmitting voice and information traffic. They are either full
rate (22.8 Kbps) or half rate (11.4 Kbps). A full rate channel possesses a total
timeslot per outline, though a half rate channel involves only one timeslot in
consistently outline.

24

2.6 Burst formats
There are five unique sorts of blasts utilized for transmission in GSM [15]. These
blasts each have an unmistakable organization structure as appeared in figure 2.9. A
burst has a span of 0.5769 ms and is regularly perceived by which legitimate channel
it is transmitted on. The GMSK conspire utilized at the air interface gives a
regulation pace of 270.833 kbit/sec, bringing about transmission of 156.25 bits in a
single burst. A short prologue to the different burst types are given beneath:

Figure 2.9: Burst Types in GSM. Adapted from [5].
• The typical burst is utilized to transmit discourse, information and flagging data. It
is made up by a three-piece tail at each end, two information fields (payloads)
comprising of 57 bits each and a mid-stroll comprising of two taking bits and a
preparation grouping. The two taking bits are utilized to show whether the burst
contains traffic (information) or flagging data. The preparation grouping is for
adjustment, for example to get the BTS and MS 'on top of' one another. It
additionally decides the beginning of information field, including the information
itself. At long last, there is a gatekeeper time between blasts which is utilized to
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isolate information bundles to maintain a strategic distance from that nearby blasts
cover.
• The frequency correction burst is used for frequency synchronization of the MS.
This burst is periodically transmitted by the BTS on the FCCH, allowing the MS to
find the beacon frequency.
• The synchronization burst is sent from the BTS on the SCH and allows the MS to
synchronize with the TDMA frame. It has two data fields of 39 bits; composed of
the FN and BSIC.
• The dummy burst is transmitted by the BTS when no other bursts are to be
transmitted. The purpose of this burst is to allow the MS to perform signal power
measurements.
• The access burst is transmitted by the MS on the RACH when it want to request a
service (e.g., to establish a call or perform a location update). In order to avoid that
the access burst overlaps with other bursts, these bursts are shorter than normal
bursts. The BTS can estimate the distance to the MS by determining how much the
burst is delayed relative to the burst sent from the BTS. It then tells the MS to start
its transmission time a number of bits earlier in order to compensate for the delay
(and to ensure arrival within the correct timeslot). This is known as a timing advance
procedure [16] [17]. MS advances its burst transmission by up to 64 steps (0-63);
each step corresponds to a distance of about 550 meters away from the BTS.
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2.7 Channel Combinations
The GSM particular allows just certain manners by which intelligent channels can
be mapped onto a physical channel [18]. These mixes are numbered from I to VII
and are transmitted on the BCCH where the BTS demonstrates the utilized blend.
This enables the MS to locate the different data components multiplexed on the
channel.
The different blends are:
I TCH/F + FACCH/F + SACCH
II TCH/H + FACCH/H + SACCH.
III 2 TCH/H + 2 FACCH/H + 2 SACCH.
IV FCCH + SCH + BCCH + CCCH
V FCCH + SCH + BCCH + CCCH + 4 SDCCH + 4 SACCH
VI BCCH + CCCH
VII 8 SDCCH + 8 SACCH
The initial three blends apply to the design of traffic channels. These mixes can be
utilized anyplace with the exception of in timeslot 0 on the signal recurrence (C0T0).
The other four blends manage the multiplexing of control channels. Mix IV is the
default standard utilized in C0T0. It can't be utilized anyplace else. The equivalent
applies to mix V, and this is frequently utilized for little cells. Mix VI is for the most
part utilized together with mix IV so as to give greater ability to paging and access
award. At last, the eight SDCCH/SACCH matches in mix VII, which is utilized to
give extra flagging limit, can be mapped to various timeslots. By show, this is
generally mapped into timeslot 1 on the primary transporter recurrence (C0T1).

27

The data transmitted in a timeslot is sorted and planned for an anticipated way, as
appeared in figure 2.10. The first timeslot (T0) in every part is constantly saved for
CCH flagging. The CCH multiplexing pursue a 51-outline cycle called a
'multiframe', while the TCH pursue a 26-outline multiframe cycle. T2 through T7 is
ordinarily apportioned to TCH. In any case, see that TCH doesn't happen on each
and every edge inside the allotted timeslot. There is one casing saved for SACCH
and one that is inactive. Along these lines, in a rush hour gridlock multiframe, an
aggregate of 24 edges are utilized for discourse information.

Figure 2.10: Mapping of Logical Channels in a GSM Multiframe
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In spite of the fact that GSM utilizes full duplex channels, the BTS and MS don't
transmit simultaneously, as showed in figure 2.11. The transmit time of the MS is
actually three timeslots later than the relating timeslot from the BTS. The game plan
is called time-division duplex (TDD) and has the bit of leeway that the MS doesn't
have to transmit and get data at the same time.

Figure 2.11: Time-Division Duplex in GSM
For example, if the MS is assigned a traffic divert in T2, the BTS transmits when the
downlink is in T2 and the MS sets to get in T2. Now, the uplink is three timeslots
behind. When the uplink comes to T2, the MS starts to transmit, and the BTS sets to
get in T2. Now, the downlink is at T5. At the point when the MS is neither
transmitting nor getting, it screens the BCCHs of contiguous cells.
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2.8 Speech Coding
GSM is a computerized correspondence standard. As the human voice is of a simple
amount, it must be changed over into an advanced piece.
The simple voice is digitized (in the ME) by a simple to-computerized converter
(ADC) at a pace of 8000 examples for every second. Each example is quantized with
a goals of 13 bits, bringing about a piece pace of 104 kbps. This bitrate is extremely
high to be transmitted over the air interface, so it must be decreased to a bitrate of
most extreme 13 kbps. A discourse encoder is utilized to pack the discourse signals.
In GSM, this can be performed by an assortment of discourse encoders: The Regular
Pulse Excitation - Linear Predictive Coding (RPC-LPC), Enhanced Full Rate (EFR)
or the most generally utilized Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR). A definite dialog of these
methodology are given in [19]. Fundamentally, they utilize vocal attributes and past
examples (data that doesn't change regularly) to create discourse casings of 260 bits
speaking to 20ms of sound, relating to a pressure proportion of 1 to 8.
Figure 2.12: Speech Encoding in GSM
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2.9 Channel Coding
Redundancy bits are inserted once a compressed digital signal is made to protect the
signal from interference. To accomplish this security, GSM incorporates block and
convolutional coding. The basic algorithms vary for channels of speech and
signaling.
A 260-bit speech sample is first divided by function and value into three parts (class
Ia, class Ib and class II bits). The most significant class is Ia, which assigns 50 bits.
132 bits and 78 bits are allocated to Class Ib and Class II respectively. For Class 1a,
three parity bits are measured and applied to the bits of Class Ib. The Class I bits (Ia
and Ib combined) are then added to an additional 4 bits. Such bits are all zeros and
are necessary in order to decode the actual convolution. For each input bit, the
encoding outputs two bits, thereby doubling the number of class I bits from 189 to
378. Eventually, without security, the least 78 bits are inserted, resulting in a speech
block of 456 bits.
To detect and correct burst errors, a 40-bit fire code is introduced for signaling
information consisting of 184 bits. Before the signal is transmitted through the same
convolution encoding as the voice, a 4-zero bits is also used. The display is also a
456-bit block here.
The complex coding schemes of the speech channel and the combined broadcast and
common control channel are shown in figure 2.13.
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Figure 2.13: Channel Coding in GSM. From [17]

2.10 Interleaving
If the entire 456-bit block is damaged or corrupted, the channel coding will be of no
use. Using interleaving is one way to alleviate the problem. Interleaving splits the
bits into many bursts so that errors can be corrected using simple methods for
forward error correction.
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A 456-bit speech block is divided into eight sub-blocks, each of 57 bits. The first
sub-block of 57 bits contains the bit numbers (0, 8, 16, 448), the second the
bit numbers (1, 9, 17, .....449). Finally, the eighth and last sub-block contains the bit
numbers (7, 15,.....455).The first four sub-blocks are mapped to four consecutive
bursts ' even-numbered bits. The remaining four sub-blocks were assigned to the odd
numbered bits of the following four consecutive bursts. Because every ordinary burst
can hold two 57-bit blocks, it contains traffic from two separate 456-bit speech
blocks as shown in figure 2.14Figure 2.14: Interleaving for Speech Blocks in GSM.
Adapted from [20]

Most of the signaling blocks (or frames) used on the BCCH, SACCH, SDCCH,
AGCH and PCH contain a similar interleaving scheme to that used for the speech
blocks. However, they are spread across four, rather than eight interleaving bursts,
as shown in figure 2.15.
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Figure 2.15: Interleaving for Signaling Blocks in GSM. Adapted from [20]

2.11 Frame Structure
An eight-timeslot sequence is known as a TDMA frame. Such frames have 4,615 ms
duration (8x 0,5769 ms) and are repeated continuously. Thereafter, many TDMA
frames are clustered to form multiframes. The command channels have exactly 51
frames (3060/13 ms) and the traffic channels have 26 frames (120 ms). In this way,
they are structured to allow a time schedule to be defined when a specific logical
channel can use a physical channel. Due to the different lengths of the two forms of
multiframes, their duration will not be the same. Since the numbers 26 and 51 are
fairly prime, however, an idle TDMA frame (the 26th) in the multiframe traffic
would overlap with any other TDMA frame in the control multiframe. It happens
once before the entire series as a superframe is synchronized. The idle frame time
helps the MS to listen to control channels or perform other required operations such
as calculating the signal strength obtained from adjacent cells.
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As a result, the multiframes are combined into superframes, consisting of either 51
multiframes or 26 control multiframe. This will result in the two forms of
superframes having the same length (6120 ms). A hyperframe is made up of 2048
superframes. -TDMA frame is numbered in the hyperframe, starting from 0 and
ending at 2,715,647, according to its series. It is used as an input over the air interface
to the encryption algorithm and to produce the sequence of slow frequency hopping.
Each burst is encrypted individually as the FN switches from burst to burst. But after
3 hours, 28 minutes, 53 seconds and 760 milliseconds, the FN repeats itself.
By structuring the signaling and speech into frames, multiframes, superframes and
a hyperframe; putting the timing and structure into a defined format that allows both
MS and BTS to communicate effectively and timely. Figure 2.16 displays the frame
structure which highlights the frame hierarchy

Figure 2.16: Frame Structure in GSM
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2.12 Frequency hopping
An additional frequency hopping technique called slow frequency hopping (SFH)
has been implemented by GSM. SFH ensures that the level of interference is
reduced, and that the overall system traffic can be increased while retaining
acceptable performance for each call [17]. This is implemented in GSM to change
channel with each burst, which means that bursts that appear at different frequencies
in adjacent frames. The resulting frequency of hopping is about 217 changes per
second, which corresponds to the length of the TDMA frame.
The MS has two types of hopping algorithms:
• Cyclic hopping: The MS adjusts transmit frequency in sequential order in keeping
with the predefined frequency list.
• Random hopping: the MS changes transmit frequency randomly through a set of
frequencies. The hopping algorithm generates the next channel frequency given the
current FN, a set of frequencies to hop between; the Mobile Allocation (MA), a start
frequency (or more precisely a time delay) within the MA; the Mobile Allocation
Index Offset (MAIO) and a parameter used to evaluate the hopping sequence; the
Hopping Sequence Number (HSN). A zero HSN corresponds to cyclic hopping,
while values 1 to 63 correspond to various types of random hopping algorithms.

36

2.13 Authentication
Authentication is one of GSM's most important security features [21][22]. A variety
of functional components are involved: SIM card, MSC, VLR and AuC. The MSC
verifies the subscriber's identity through a process of challenge-response. Upon
request from the MSC, the VLR returns a triplet3 authentication consisting of a 128bit random number (RAND), a signed 32-bit response (SRES) and the Kc session
key. When an MS requests service, the MSC challenges it by sending in an MM
Authentication Request message the RAND and a 3-bit Cipher Key Sequence
Number (CKSN) 4. Until access to the network is allowed, the MS must pass this
challenge. The RAND is forwarded for storage from MS to the SIM. The data that
entity provides to authenticate the SIM is shown in Figure 2.17. The SIM takes the
RAND value and the Individual Subscriber Authentication Key Ki of 128-bit and
generates a signed response (SRES)5 of 32-bit. This is the response of the MS to the
request that in an RR Authentication Response is sent back to the network. If the
SRES value is the same as the one given in the triplet of authentication, the
authentication will be efficient.

Figure 2.17: Authentication in GSM. Modified from [23]
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2.14 Confidentiality
In addition to the requirements required to authenticate users, the SIM card also
provides confidentiality parameters. Figure 2.18 shows how over the air interface
the data flow is encrypted. A session key Kc is generated using an algorithm called
A8. The SIM runs the A8 algorithm to generate a 64-bit Kc by using RAND and the
Ki pin. A third algorithm called A5 uses Kc. The A5 is used to create a 228-bit key
stream from the Kc and the current time slot FN in which the message's next segment
is sent. The key stream is broken down into two parts. While the first half encrypts
the frame downlink, the second half is used to encrypt the frame uplink. A5
calculates a new 228-bit key stream to encrypt (and decrypt) the frame for each
transmitted frame.
In the ME hardware portion, the A5 algorithm is implemented, not in the SIM card.
To generate a new collection of 228 bits every 4,615 milliseconds, it must work
rapidly and continuously. The A5 must also be standard to all GSM systems as the
terminals are designed to operate in different networks.

Figure 2.18: Key Generation and Encryption in GSM. Modified from [23]
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There is an alternative for network operators to encrypt between three A5 algorithms,
namely the A5/1, A5/2 and A5/3. It is mandatory for A5/1, A5/2 and non-encrypted
mode (A5/0) to be introduced on the MS, according to the GSM specifications [24].
The network is not to provide service to an MS indicating that it does not support
any of the ciphering algorithms mentioned [25]. Section 3.2 provides a more detailed
analysis of A5/1.

2.15 Call setup
There is a difference in originating mobile call (MOC) and a terminating mobile call
(MTC) in GSM [21]. A MOC indicates the call came from an MS and is therefore
an outgoing call. A MTC reveals the call ends at the MS, hence an incoming call.
Figure 2.19 provides an air interface sequence diagram for both MTC and MOC link
configuration. It also shows how in theory the different logical channels are used.

Figure 2.19: Message Flows in a MTC and MOC
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Mobile-originating Call (MOC)
Establishing an MOC begins with the initiation of an RR Channel Request by the
MS transmitting an access burst on the RACH. On the same ARFCN as the BCH,
this is sent uplink. With an RR Immediate Assignment message on AGCH, the
network responds; assigning the MS to an SDCCH. This message also contains the
FN of when receiving the RR Channel Request, frequency hopping data and a
parameter for the timing advance.
The MS sends an MM Service Request after the initial set-up containing its TMSI /
IMSI, CKSN, supported A5 versions and the requested service-in this case an MOC.
With an MM Service Request Acknowledgment, the network accepts the request by
including the TMSI for purposes of contention resolution.
As defined in section 2.13, the network starts performing authentication (if
necessary). This is accompanied by a network-issued ciphering procedure using the
email RR Cipher Mode Order. It is sent to show the chosen algorithm for encryption
and could also be used to query the IMEISV. The MS starts encrypting (and
decrypting) and responds with the full message of an encoded RR Cipher Mode. All
effective contact between the MS and BTS will be encrypted from this moment on.
The MS sends a CC Setup email containing the so-called MSISDN until ciphering
begins. If the number is right, the network responds with a CC call message and
sends an RR Assignment Command to get the MS off the SDCCH and onto a
TCH+FACCH. This payment is confirmed by the MS with a complete RR
assignment message on the FACCH. All signaling transactions will be conducted on
that channel from this point on.
A CC Alerting message is sent back from the network to warn the called subscriber
(in the presence of a ringing tone). If the called party responds, the networks send a
message from the CC Connect confirming that the connection has been established
successfully. Eventually, the MS responds with a message of CC Connect
Acknowledge message which shows that it is able to share voice data on the TCH.
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The TCH+FACCH assignment can occur at any time during the setup, depending
on the configuration of the GSM network. There is essentially three approaches:
• Late Assignment (Off Air Call Set-Up (OACSU)): A TCH+FACCH is assigned to
the MS first when it receives the alerting message.
• Early Assignment (Non-OACSU): A TCH+FACCH is assigned to the MS after it
receives the call proceeding message. The call setup is initially performed on the
SDCCH, but completed on the FACCH. This is the most common option chosen by
operators [24, p. 142] and described in section 2.15.
• Very Early Assignment: A TCH+FACCH is assigned immediately to the MS
without using a SDCCH. The entire call setup is performed on the FACCH.

Mobile-terminating Call (MTC)
The MTC process is very similar to the MOC process. By sending an RR Paging
Request message to the PCH, the BTS initiates the transaction. In answer, a RR
Channel Request message is transmitted by the MS on the RACH. The response sent
by the BTS on the AGCH is an Immediate Assignment message with the SDCCH
number. The MS responds with a message containing its mobile identity (IMSI or
TMSI) from RR Paging Response. Then the rest of the call configuration is the same
as the MOC as described in section 2.15. The TCH+FACCH assignment can occur
at any time, as with the MOC.

2.16 SMS setup
The GSM specifications include details on how SMS messages are transferred
between the network and the MS [26]. The terms mobile-originating and mobileterminating are also used to indicate the direction in which the SMS message is sent,
similar to the call setup.
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Mobile-originating SMS (MO-SMS)
In a MO-SMS, assuming delivery is done when no active call is in progress, a
SDCCH is allocated to the MS implementing the same establishment procedure as
defined in a MOC. Immediately thereafter, a CM Service Request message is sent
from the MS and it initiates recognized mode (multiple frame) with a Set
Asynchronous Balanced Mode (SABM) protocol after setting the cipher mode. The
SABM is used as a setup message to create a MS-BTS data link.
The MS transmits a message from SMS CP-DATA that includes a message from
RP-DATA as the RPDU. The RP-DATA contains all the information needed to be
delivered successfully and the actual SMS message. The network responds with a
message from SMS CP-ACK and sends a message from CP-DATA to the MS,
including the RP-ACK payload in the RPDU. The MS answers with a SMS CPACK message and the network releases the SDCCH with a RR Channel Release
message.

Mobile-terminating SMS (MT-SMS)
The MT-SMS system is the reverse operation of an MO-SMS in many respects. With
the standard paging protocol, the network begins paging the MS and the MS is
allocated an SDCCH using the standard RR Paging Response response. The rest of
the SMS setup is identical to a MO-SMS setup, apart from the flows in the opposite
direction.
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Attacking A5/1
One outcome of this project is a set of rainbow tables that can be utilized to decrypt
a conversation about GSM. This chapter provides the important background theory
and explains in detail the rainbow table attack on A5/1.

3.1 Related Work
Related work has been done over the past two decades to target A5/1. Nevertheless,
until 2003, when Barkan et al. reported their results, a realistic attack did not occur.
They used a passive time-memory-only ciphertext trade-off attack that required a
large amount of pre-computed tables[27]. This was the first real attack that did not
require large quantities of known plaintext. It cannot be said for sure if the tables
were generated. Nonetheless, tables had never been released publicly
In 2007, two groups led by Prof. C. Paar (Bochum University of Ruhr) and Prof.
M. Schimmler (Kiel University of Christian-Albrechts) created a Cost-Optimized
Parallel Code Breaker (COPACOBANA), a FPGA-based machine that could be
used to create tables using the same principles as described in Barkan et al. The
FPGA solution had been made available commercially [2], but no tables have been
released. Represented by David Hulton and Steve Muller, The Hackers Choice
(THC) repeated the 2003 attack with 68 FPGA boards [29] in 2008. This team also
had a sister project called Air Probe [30] which developed GSM signaling traffic
capture and decoding technology. It was claimed that Rainbow tables were
computed, but never published. They assumed that only 54 bits are the key size used
in GSM. Although this was the case a few years ago in several countries, as of today
it is not the case. This means that they would not be useful in the process of attacking.
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3.2 A5/1
Originally, none of the security algorithms introduced in GSM were made available
to the public, but some were subsequently reversed and leaked [31]. This section
describes in detail the cryptographic algorithm used in GSM, A5/1.
GSM ciphering is carried out using the A5/1 stream cipher consisting of three linear
shift registers of feedback (LFSR). These are called R1, R2 and R3, and are of 19,
22 and 23 length respectively. In an LFSR, every time the register is clocked, all bits
are shifted one place to the end1 of the register.
It leaves the least significant bit (lsb) blank, which means that this bit needs a
different way to get its new value. This is solved by having a couple of tapped bits
in each register. As shown in figure 3.1, R1's tapped bits are bits 13, 16, 17, and 18,
R2 bit 20 and 21, and R3 bit 7, 20, 21, and 22. Whenever a register is clocked, the
value of these taps is read out prior to the shift. Their values are then combined with
XOR and the output is used as a bit 0 input. The majority function determines
whether a register is clocked or not. There are three clocking bits, respectively
denoted by C1, C2 and C3. C1 is R1 bit 8, C2 is R2 bit 10, and C3 is R3 bit 10. The
value of these bits is analyzed at each clock cycle, clocking the two or three registers
whose bit agrees with the majority.
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Figure 3.1: The A5/1 stream cipher used for encryption in GSM. Modified from
[32]

The A5/1 algorithm takes a 64-bit Kc key and a 22-bit Fn frame number as its
input and produces 228 keystream bits. The output is the outcome of the XORed
bits 18, 21 and 22. Messages are sent in bursts containing 114-bit payload
between the MS and the BTS, and since the same frame number can be used twice
in a row2, A5/1 needs to produce 228-bit keystream. The keystream's first 114
bits are used for downlink traffic encryption (BTS to MS), while the last 114 bits
are reserved for uplink traffic encryption (MS to BTS).
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From initialization to 228-bits of keystream, the A5/1 algorithm is as follows:
1. All three registers are set to 0. The key is then mixed in parallel with the
following algorithm for 64 cycles in the registers:
for i = 0 to 63 do
R1[0] = R1[0] Kc[i]
R2[0] = R2[0] Kc[i]
R3[0] = R3[0] Kc[i]
Clock all three registers according to the regular clocking scheme.
end for
Where Ri[0] denotes the lsb of register Ri, Kc[0] the lsb in the key and Kc[63] the
most significant bit. It’s important to notice that the majority clocking mechanism is
not used at this stage.

2. 22 additional cycles are clocked, still overlooking the majority function. During
this period the frame number is XORed into the lsb of the registers in the same
way as with the key, that is:
for i = 0 to 63 do
R1 [0] = R1 [0] Fn[i]
R2 [0] = R2 [0] Fn[i]
R3 [0] = R3 [0] Fn[i]
Clock all three registers according to the regular clocking scheme.
end for
3. 100 additional clocks are performed with the the regular majority clocking
mechanism activated, but the output is discarded. The content of the registers at the
end of this state is what we refer to as the initial state of A5/1.
4. 228 clocks are performed to produce 228 bits of keystream. This is keystream is
then XORed with the plaintext in order to encrypt the data.
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3.3 A Cryptanalytic Time-Memory Trade-Off
Using a cryptanalytical time-memory trade-off, A5/1 can be targeted. The idea of
such a time-memory trade-off (TMTO) comes from Hellman, who proposed a
TMTO attack against block ciphers in 1980 that can recover an N key cryptosystem
with high probability in N2/3 operations using N2/3 memory words [33]. Several
improvements, analyses and optimizations have been released in relation to TMTO
attacks since then. It would be a very extensive task to go into the details of these
and is also without the scope of this thesis. Instead, this section will focus on
providing the necessary background theory to understand the time- memory tradeoff attack on A5/1.

3.3.1 Hellman’s Time-Memory Trade-Off
There are two naive methods to cracking a block cipher; exhaustive search and
table search. A known-plaintext attack is the exhaustive search technique, where
the ciphertext is deciphered with each key and then compared to the known
plaintext. This gives T= O (N) time complexity and M= 1. memory requirement.
The approach taken in a table lookup attack is to encrypt with each of the possible
N keys some fixed plaintext in order to produce different N ciphertexts. Then
these ciphertexts are sorted and stored in a table of size M= N together with their
keys. The cost of pre-computing such an attack is N operations and the time
complexity of searching is T = O (1).
The problem with these two methods is either that the attack time in the case
of exhaustive search is either too long, i.e. T= O(N), or that they require a
large amount of memory, i.e. M= N in the case of table search. Consider, for
example, the amount of memory needed to create a 64-bit key lookup table:
M = 2 × 64 × 264 bits = 128 × 264/23 × 240 Terabytes = 268 435 456 Terabytes
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A number that, in fact, makes such an attack unlikely. Comparison with the timememory trade-off from Hellman, which only requires N2/3 memory terms, is
simple. In the same case, the memory requirement for a 64-bit key would be:
M = 2 × 64 × (264_2/3) bits = 128 × (264_2/3)/ 23 × 240 Terabytes ≈102
Terabytes
Although a large memory requirement is still required, it is well within the limits
of what is practically feasible. With a price of about $130 for a 2 TB hard drive, it
would cost about $130= $6630 to get 102 Terabytes of memory.
This is a price to be regarded as a small investment for larger organizations.
In 1980, Hellman implemented his block ciphers trade-off in time-memory. This
can be encrypted with the cipher S due to a set plaintext block P0. Therefore, the
ciphertext C is given by:
C = Sk(P0)
The attack works by creating chains made up of pairs of key-ciphertext. The start
of the chain is a key value ki. Use this key to encrypt P0 to get Ci= Ski (P0). Using
a reduction function4 R on Ci, the ciphertext Ci can then be transformed to a key
ki+1. Thus, alternating key and ciphertext chains can be created by applying the
cipher S and the reduction function R successively:
𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑆)

𝑆(𝑆𝑆)

𝑆𝑆𝑆+1(𝑆𝑆)

𝑆𝑆 →𝑆𝑆 →𝑆𝑆 + 1 →𝑆𝑆 + 1 →𝑆𝑆 + 2 → ⋯

𝑆(𝑆𝑆+1)

R (Sk(P0)) is the sequence of operations that generates a key from a key. It is
Called f (k) = R(Sk(P0)) and leads to a chain of keys:
𝑆

𝑆

𝑆

𝑆𝑆 → 𝑆𝑆 + 1 → 𝑆𝑆 + 2 → …
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As shown in Figure 3.2, a table consists of length t m chains. Nonetheless, to reduce
memory requirements, only the first and last elements are stored in each string. The
goal is to find out if the key used to generate C is in the table given a ciphertext C.
The first step is to apply R to C to get a Y1 pin. This key is compared to the table
endpoints, and if a match is found, the key used to encipher C could be found in the
corresponding chain's next to last row. From the starting point, the chain can be
reconstructed to probably locate this key. If no matching endpoint exists, the
function f will be applied until a matching endpoint is identified or until a total of t
− 1 times has been applied. A match with one of the table endpoints doesn't
necessarily mean you can find the key in that row. This is because of the so-called
false alarms. In this article, a detailed description of false alarms will be given later.

Figure 3.2: Illustration of a single Hellman table of size m × t[34]
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One of Hellman's time-memory tradeoff's drawbacks is that chains can collide and
merge starting with different keys. This is a consequence of R providing only an
arbitrary reduction in key space from the space of ciphertexts. Merges contribute to
less effective tables, as more than one chain can cover keys. The chance of finding
a key by using a table of m rows of t keys is given by [35]:
𝑆

Ptable ≥ ∑𝑆
𝑆

∑𝑆−1

𝑆=0(1

𝑆=1

𝑆𝑆 𝑆+1

(3.1)

− 𝑆)

As can be seen, with its size, the efficiency of a single table is declining rapidly.
Therefore, it is best to produce several tables in order to obtain a high probability of
success, where a different reduction function is used for that table. When using more
than one table, collisions that occur between chains of different tables, but they will
not overlap as various reduction functions are used in different tables. The likelihood
of success is given by [35] using l tables:

𝑆

Psuccess ≥ 1 − ( ∑𝑆
𝑆

𝑆=1

∑𝑆−1

𝑆�
� 𝑆+1 ) 𝑆

𝑆=0(1 − )

(3.2)

𝑆

False alarms
Having a similar endpoint in the table, as mentioned earlier, does not necessarily
mean the key is in the table. False alarms are needed, because computational time
needs to be spent searching a key through a string, just not finding it.
Let s be the length of the chain generated when a matching endpoint is located, and
let z denote this generated chain:
𝑆

𝑆

𝑆

𝑆

𝑆 → 𝑆1 → 𝑆2 → … → 𝑆𝑆
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This chain is then determined from the starting point Sj, given an endpoint Ej that
matches Ys. It was only a false alarm if Y1 is not found in this chain. This is the
product of combining chain z with the chain where we find a false alarm somewhere
later than Y1's line. For a Hellman table for hash values, Figure 3.3 shows an
example of a false alarm. In this example h1 is the given hash value to which we are
looking, in this case 1. If the reduction function R and the hash function H are applied
successively to h1, the result will be the value 9 after a few alternations. As this is
also an endpoint in the table, there will now be a false alarm. Remember that we
would still get a false alarm even if the second row wasn't a chain in the table. In
other terms, as a result of combining with chains inside and outside the table, false
alarms occur.

Figure 3.3: Hellman table for hash values showing the occurrence of a false alarm.
h1 is the hash value that we’re looking for the password for, and the false alarm
happens at the point where h1 is transformed into the password value 9. Modified
from [36]

51

3.3.2 Rivest’s Distinguished Point Method
Rivest came in 1982 with the suggestion that distinguished points should be used as
endpoints for the generated chains [37]. A distinguished point is an endpoint that
satisfies certain easily checked syntactic properties, e.g. zero is the first ten bits of a
key. The number of data searches required is drastically reduced by requiring all
endpoints to be distinct points. A chain of keys is generated with a ciphertext C until
a distinguished point is found. And then is it looked up in the memory to find out in
which chain the key was found and what that chain's starting point is.
In [38] Borst et Al. pointed out that one of the advantages of respected points is that
it is easy to detect mergers. This is because two merging chains end up having the
same endpoint; the next after the merger. Since the endpoints need to be sorted
anyway, the merges can be found and eliminated at no extra cost. This means that
merge free tables can be generated simply by removing a merging chain and
replacing it with a new one.
Another advantage Borst et Al. noted in [38] is that it is possible to use distinguished
points to discover loops. If after producing a large number of keys5 a distinguished
point is not reached, it is generally a good indicator that a loop is embedded in the
string. To order to obtain loop-free tables, it is therefore discarded.
Unfortunately, a backside often comes with the use of respected points; the chain
length variation. Short chains will result in increased storage requirements, while
long chains will increase lookup time, result in more fusions, and thus produce more
false alarms as well. As noted above, it is easy to remove mergers and replace them
with new chains. The removal of a chain does not, however, remove the false alarms
as a false alarm does not depend on the chain being part of the table.
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3.3.3 Oechslin’s Rainbow Tables
The theory of Rainbow Tables comes from the idea published by Philippe Oechslin
in his article making a Faster Cryptanalytic Time-Memory Trade-Off [39]. The
rainbow tables of Oechslin provide a solution to the main limitation of Hellman's
trade-off in time-memory, the fact that two chains colliding within a single table will
merge. There may still be collisions within the same table of rainbow links, but the
chains do not usually merge.
The distinction between the tables of Hellman and the rainbow tables lies in the use
of the reduction function. While the original tables use the same reduction function
for all m / t chains within a single table, for each point in the chain, rainbow tables
use a different reduction function. With the reduction function R1 a chain of length
t begins and ends with the reduction function Rt−1. The big advantage of this method
is that if two chains collide inside a plate, they converge only if the collision occurs
in both chains at the same place. This is because both chains will continue after the
collision with different reduction functions. It also follows that if a collision occurs
in a chain of length t, the probability for the two chains to merge
is only 1.
i

Figure 3.4 provides an example of the disparity in layout between the original tables
of Hellman and the rainbow tables of Oechslin. The figure shows on the left t
classical tables of size m asl, and on the right a single rainbow table of size mt asl.
The first step when searching in rainbow tables is to check whether key is in the
table's next to last column. This is achieved by adding Rt−1 to the ciphertext and
then comparing the result to the table endpoints. If there is a connection, it is possible
to use the stored starting point to reconstruct the chain and find the key used to
generate the ciphertext. If the endpoint is not found, the second to last column is
checked by applying Rt−2, ft−1 to the ciphertext. If it is not there, Rt−3, ft−2, ft−1
is applied, and so forth until the whole chain hs been checked. The total
number of calculations needed to be performed during lookup is thus 𝑆(𝑆−1)[39].
2

53

This is half as much as with Hellman’s tables that uses t2 calculations to search t
tables of size m × t.

The probability of success within a single rainbow table of size m × t is given by
[39]:
)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 1 − ∏𝑆 (1 − 𝑆𝑆
𝑆=1

(3.3)

𝑆
𝑆𝑆

Where m1 = m and mn+1= 𝑆(1 − 𝑆− 𝑆 )

The success rate of rainbow tables can be contrasted directly with that of classical
tables, according to Oechslin [39]. In fact, the probability of success of t classical
tables of size m magnitude is approximately equal to that of a single rainbow table
of size mt magnitude t, since mt2 keys are covered with t different reduction
functions in both cases. It is also interesting to note that a collision within a collection
of mt keys (a single classic table or a column in a rainbow table) results in a fusion,
while collisions with any of the remaining keys do not result in a fusion. Figure 3.5
compares the likelihood of success. Remember that in order to fit equation 3.2, one
axis was relabeled from t to l. Similar to classical tables, rainbow tables seem to have
a marginally better chance of success. Though, this could very well be just that
Hellman's tables ' success rate is lower, whereas the rainbow tables ' success
probability is the same expectation [39].
Compared to the distinguished point tables of Hellman, it becomes evident that
rainbow tables share some of the same advantages as distinguished points, but
without suffering from their limitations. According to Oechslin:
• Table look-ups are reduced by a factor of t compared to the original method of
Hellman. However, as disk access is reduced when using distinguished points, it is
still expected that rainbow tables will be outperformed by distinguished points due
to the large expenses associated with disk access.
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• A merging into a rainbow table would result in two similar endpoints, which
ensures that mergers can be identified just as easily as with distinguished points.
This also means that mergers-free Rainbow tables can be created.

Figure 3.5: Comparison of the success rate of Hellman’s tables and rainbow tables.
The upper surface represents the constraint of 99.9% success with classical tables,
wheras the lower surface is the same constraint, but for rainbow tables instead [39].
• Since a rainbow table has a new reduction feature for each line, there can be no
loops. This is better than the identification of loops used in distinguished stages, as
there is no need to waste time creating loops that will still be rejected.
• Rainbow chains have a fixed length, thus preventing the adverse effects of variable
chain length endured by respected individuals. This means that in rainbow tables
there are fewer instances of fusions and false alarms.
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3.3.4 A Cryptanalytic Time/Memory/Data Trade-off for
Stream Ciphers
There are two major types of cryptosystems with symmetric key; block ciphers and
stream ciphers. Block ciphers take and encrypt a number of bytes as a single unit,
while stream ciphers encrypt a bit at a time. In addition, block ciphers are encrypted
by invertibly mixing plaintext with the key, while stream ciphers use the key to
construct a keystream XORed with the plaintext.
The trade-off of Hellman and Oechslin was both targeted at block ciphers. Because
a block cipher takes the plaintext and key as input and generates ciphertext as output,
each ciphertext for block ciphers corresponds to a particular plaintext. Therefore, a
pre-computed table for a block cipher can only be used for a particular known
plaintext.
On the other hand, when it comes to time-memory trade-off attacks, stream ciphers
have a very different behavior. It uses its internal state as input and as output it
generates a keystream. This means that we have state-keystream pairs that are
independent of any specific plaintext and therefore it is possible to create precomputed tables that can be used independently of the plaintext.
Babbage [40] and Golic [41] identified separately the first time-memory trade-off
for stream ciphers. They connect each of the generator's possible N states with the
first log2(N) keystream bits generated from those states by the stream cipher. One
can describe this mapping as:
f(x) = y

(3.4)

56

Where x is the stream cipher's internal state and y is the keystream generated from
x. The attack works by selecting M random xi states, calculating their corresponding
keystream yi, and then storing all (xi, yi) pairs on a disc sorted by the yi order. Only
Mout of N states are covered, but by providing more known data points D, coverage
can be increased. As the search is performed on keystream log2(N) bits, D data
points bring us a total of D − log2(N) + 1 keystream samples. Thus, all D−log2(N)+1
keystream samples in the table can be searched.
This increases the probability of a hit by

1

()1

. If a match is found, the rest

of the plaintext can be derived by running the keystream generator from that point
on.
In the article Cryptanalytic Time / Memory / Data Tradeoffs for Stream Ciphers [42],
Biryukov et Al. suggested a general attack that incorporates the work of both
Hellman, Babbage and Golic. Their idea is to apply f(x)= y from 3.4 successively
and a function that maps the keystream back into the state space. This is the basis
for the attack used in the A5/1 Security Project, which will be explained in section
3.5 in detail.
It is interesting to note that with time-memory trade-offs that have more than one
data point, distinguished points match especially well. This is because a disk access
operation is extremely expensive and should be avoided if possible. Therefore, the
gain becomes even more evident when you look up more than one keystream sample.

3.4 A5/1’s Reduced Keystream Space
As explained in section 3.2, mixing in a 64-bit key initializes A5/1. To ensure that
A5/1 is cryptographically strong, it is important that this key is used in a manner that
provides an almost equal size keystream space. Sadly, it turns out that this is not the
case with A5/1, and after the 100 clocking the keystream space is reduced to just
16% of the original size [43]. This section will provide information about the
keystream space reduction of A5/1.
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Clocking back A5/1
To understand why keystream space is reduced in A5/1, it is first necessary to look
at the principle of back-clocking.
It is important to know either the key or the state of A5/1 just after the key has been
mixed in to decrypt a full conversation. Both of these are of equal value as the
keystream can be calculated directly from both for each frame in a conversation.
Some back-clocking is required in the process of getting this state.
Clocking back one single register is a trivial task. When clocked forward, all the
tapped bits are XORed together and the result used as input to the rightmost bit (lsb).
Backward clocking on the other hand, is performed by taking all the tapped bits
except the leftmost (msb), and then XORing these together with the rightmost bit.
After this, all registers are shifted one step to the right, and the result from the XOR
operation is stored in the leftmost bit position. It is when clocking back the entire
A5/1 machine that things get more complicated, since majority clocking needs to be
taken into account. However, the reason why the A5/1 algorithm uses only 16% of
the key space is also revealed when looking closer at this process.
Accessing a single log is a trivial task. Once clocked forward, all the tapped bits will
be XORed together and the result will be used as the right bit (lsb) input. On the
other side, by taking all but the leftmost (msb) bits, backward clocking is achieved,
and then XORing them together with the right bit. Both registers are then shifted one
step to the right, and the output of the XOR operation is stored in the leftmost bit
position. When the whole A5/1 system is clocked out, things get more complicated,
as the bulk clocking has to be taken into account.
Through looking at each LFSR's clockbits and the bit to the left, it becomes obvious
that there are a total of 26 = 64 combinations of 7 of the values these bits may have.
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Let S(t)= (S1(t), S2(t), S3(t)) denote the entire internal state of A5/1 at time t ≥ 0,
where S(0) is the internal state of A5/1 immediately after the frame number is mixed
in. At the same time, let C(t) denote the clock-control sequence at time t _ 0, so that
if C(t) ={1,2}, then records 1 and 2 are to be clocked, if C(t) ={1,2,3} is to be
clocked, then records 1,2 and 3 are to be clocked, etc. Let (i,j, k) denote (1,2,3)
permutation. Then there may be the following six events [44]:
A: for any k, if S’I = S’j ≠ S’k =Sk then C(t − 1) = {i, j}
B: for any k, if S’I = S’j ≠ S’k ≠Sk then C(t − 1) can take no values
C: if s’1= s’2= s’3= s1= s2 = s3, then C(t − 1) = {1, 2, 3}
D: if s’1= s’2= s’3≠ s1= s2 = s3, then C(t − 1) can take every of the four values {1, 2},
{1, 3}, {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3}
E: if s’1= s’2= s’3≠ si= sj ≠ sk , then C(t − 1) can take every of the two values {i, j}
and {1, 2, 3}
F: if s’1= s’2= s’3≠ si≠ sj = sk , then C(t − 1) can take every of the three values {i, j},
{i, k} and {1, 2, 3}
Furthermore, when an internal state S(t) is to be randomly chosen according to
uniform distribution, then the number of solutions for S(t − 1) is a nonnegative
integer random variable Z with the probability distribution[44]:
As can be seen, 24 of 64 states cannot be clocked 1 step back. This means that there
is no way that such a state can exist, and it is therefore called an illegal state. A
conclusion that follows immediately from this is that the keystream space is
reduced to 1 – 24 = 0.625 = 62.5% of the original key space. An example of such a
64

state can be seen in figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of an illegal A5/1 state, S (t), that can’t be clocked back
Looking at the bits to the left of the clocking bits, it becomes apparent that the
registers clocked in the previous round were R1 and R3 registers, as they constitute
the majority function. The result is the state seen in figure 3.7 by clocking R1 and
R3 one step back.
It's easy to see that this state is not a true one, because R2 is now now part of the
clocking mechanism of the majority, a contrast to the step back-clocking that has
just been completed. Therefore, if an attempt was made to clock it forward from S
(t − 1) to S (t), one would end up with a different state.
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Figure 3.7: Illustration showing an A5/1 state clocked back from S (t) to S (t−1)
Golic pointed out in the paper Cryptanalysis of Alleged A5 Stream Cipher [44] that
24 of 64 states cannot be clocked back 1 stage, but oddly enough Golic fails to see
the connection between this and the resulting decrease in key stream space. A person
named M vd S discovered this8, however, and posted his findings on the mailing list
of the A5/1 Security Project [45]. M vd S took one million random states and tried
100 times to clock them home. In order to check that the numbers are accurate, this
was done several times. His discovery was that only 14% of the states can be clocked
back 100 times. It means that 86% of states do not have ancestors, so they are
illegitimate states. It also follows that A5/1's mainstream storage is just 14% of the
original 264, as 100 majority clocking steps are performed before A5/1 starts to
produce the key stream. Table 3.1 summarizes the observations as an example of
what is happening in figure 3.8.
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Number of back clocking

Amount of illegal states

16 back
32 back
48 back
64 back
80 back
96 back
100 back
150 back

57% illegal states
68% illegal states
74% illegal states
78% illegal states
82% illegal states
84% illegal states
86% illegal states
89% illegal states
Table 3.1: Illegal states
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Figure 3.8: State space convergence in A5/1 during 100 clock cycles. Grey paths are
not accessible through forward clocking, green paths have many ancestors’ states
leading to the same keystream, whereas red paths have few ancestors leading to the
same keystream
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As it can be seen, some initial states converge and end up in the same state. It is also
shown how 86% of states are unconstitutional and end up in a dead end if clocked
back.

Looking at this picture, it becomes evident that a state can have multiple ancestors.
We would usually be between 1 and 100 sibling states after having clocked back a
certain amount of clockings [46]. Figure 3.9 shows the frequency observed in a
sample set of one million random states for the number of sibling states. The blue
dots are the distribution of sibling states when they first clock 100 forward and then
100 backwards, whereas the red dots apply to the distribution when they clock 100
times backwards without first clocking forward. In the last example, the data point
shows that no ancestors have been excluded from 848000 of 1 million countries.
Taking a uniform distribution of 264, it would be expected the number of
ancestors to be 1
= 7.1. Although figure 3.9 shows a peak at around 7, the
0.14

weighted average for forward-backward clocking is 13.04 and for backward
clocking 1.00. An average of 13.04 seems to indicate that the initial state space
converges to 1 = 0.077 = 7.7% of the initial space. However, this is not the case.
13.04

Figure 3.10 illustrates what happens.
The red dotted line reveals that half of the keystreams find their origin in 82% of the
initial states, while the other half find their origin in only 18% of the initial states.
Moreover, the blue dotted line indicates that in 30% of the initial states 10 percent
of the actual keystreams seek their source. In other words, we see that A5/1 tends to
prefer a smaller group of preferred states. It means that there is an even greater
chance of getting a hit in the chart, as only 50% of the keystream encompasses 82%
of the initial states.

64

Figure 3.9: Illustration showing the distribution of siblings after having clocked
back a state 100 times
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Figure 3.10: Illustration showing how the state space in A5/1 convergences
towards a few preferred states
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3.5 The A5/1 Security Project
Karsten Nohl and others initiated the A5/1 Security Project in August 2009 as a reimplementation of THC's 2008 project. We participated, and used air probe, RTL
SDR, Gnu Radio and USRP to decode GSM.

3.5.1 Table Structure
The existing tables are a mix of esteemed points Hellman Tables and rainbow tables.
All chains are formed in the same way within a single table. The only thing
separating them is that they all have different starting points.
The single chain generation begins with taking a 64-bit random value and putting it
in the A5/1 registers. A5/1 is then initially clocked 100 steps forward with the output
bits discarded before another 64 clocking occurs when the output is stored as a key
stream. The reason for doing 100 clocking first, as explained in section 3.4, is to
prevent creating keystream tables that would never exist after the 100 initial clocking
in A5/1. A transformation is needed in order to map this key stream from the reduced
key stream space into the entire space of initial states. XORing the keystream
performs this transformation with a 64-bit round function that extracts its value from
an LFSR's output. This LFSR is initialized with the same value every time12, but
the difference between the round functions is that they all use different parts of the
LFSR-output as their value. The LSFR has an advance function, and each time this
is called, 64-bit output is created. The table takes a number, id, as input, advance id
times calls and uses the bits generated during the last call as the first-round function.
By not using any two ids less than 8 numbers apart as input to a table, having the
same round function being used again can be avoided.
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Every table uses 8 round functions, and when a distinguished point is reached, the
round function is modified. The sign chosen as a distinguished point is that the main
stream's last 12 bits will be zero, and the round function will be modified whenever
this happens by calling forward once. As stated in subsection 3.3.2, it is also possible
to use distinguished points to detect loops. Therefore, if a distinguished point was
not detected before 3 million steps of A5/1 were produced, a chain will be dropped.
For each table, a total of 8,662,000,000 chains are formed, where only the starting
point and endpoint for each chain is stored. The chains are then slowly sorted on
their end value while eliminating any merging chains at the same time.

3.5.2 Table Lookup
A minimum of 64-bits of known keystream is required to do a table lookup. Knowing
the keystream is similar to knowing the plaintext, as we are already in control of the
ciphertext. This is because keystream K can be deduced simply by XORing together
the plaintext P and the ciphertext C:
C * P = (P * K) * P = (P * P) * K = K
Looking up is a easily doable task given a 64-bit keystream sample K. First move is
to test whether K can be found in a table within one of the eight round intervals. For
this reason, 8 separate chains are determined from K, where each chain begins with
one of the 8 round functions used by the table in which we look up and ends with
the last round function. It generates 8 separate chains; the endpoints of which must
be matched with those of the tables. If two endpoints match, the entire chain will be
generated from the starting point until K is found again. The value that appears just
before K, unless a false alarm, is the initial state of A5/1 100 clocking before
keystream K begins.
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We are interested in knowing the state of A5/1 immediately after mixing in the
session key Kc, but before mixing in the frame number. In a full conversation,
understanding this one would be able to produce the keystream for each frame, since
the frame number is already known to the public. A5/1 generates 228 bits of
keystream, as stated in section 3.2. Based on where our keystream sample is taken
from in those 228 bits, we need to do a different amount of backclocking to find the
desired state. Let Ki denote the keystream from bit position I and out, where I= 0 is
at the start of the generation of the keystream. It is then necessary to clock back
i+100 +22 steps just after Kc has been mixed in to find the state. Consider the case
of a 64-bit keystream sample in the 228 output bits from A5/1 from bit position 10
to 73. To arrive at the desired state, 10+100+22=132 steps would have to be clocked
back. This will lead to some 13 separate nominee states, as stated in section 3.4.
These are all states that for that particular frame generate the same keystream, but
only one of them is the right state that can be used to decrypt the rest of the
conversation. Therefore, if we want to decrypt a whole conversation, it is necessary
to find the appropriate candidate key. However, this is a trivial task, as it only needs
to be tested on another frame.
As it will be mentioned in Chapter 8, there are several frames that can contain a
minimum of 64-bits of known plaintext, giving us the keystream sample required.
Nonetheless, multiple candidates are likely to contain even more known keystream.
The Babbage [ 50] and Golic [ 51] techniques mentioned in subsection 3.3.4 can be
applied to increase the likelihood of success provided n > 64 bits of keystream.
This would give n − 64 + 1 different keystream samples that can be used
to do look up with.
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3.5.3 Expected coverage
It is no trivial task to do a mathematical analysis of the projected distribution of the
tables, as it is difficult to estimate the number of merges. Nevertheless, there are
some specific observations that should be noted.
As stated in section 3.4, after 100 clockings, the keystream space shrinks to just
14%. This means that A5/1's active keystream space is no greater than
Keystream space = 264 × 0.14 = 261.16
In addition, since 51 keystream samples can be used when doing lookup, only
1
Of the keystream space needs to be covered. This means that the tables only
51

need to cover:
Cover criteria = 264 × 0.14= 255, 49
51

When it comes to measuring table coverage however, things get more complicated.
Giving an estimate of the number of fusions is a complex task as it increases with
the size of the plate. Therefore, the fact that A5/1 has favored states will also
influence the number of fusions. A closer study of this may be part of a future
research aimed at improving the table structure.
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